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Stanley Cavell and Film is Catherine Wheatley’s entry in Bloomsbury’s “Film Thinks”, a 
series dedicated to explorations of cinema’s influence on thinkers such as Noël Carroll, Roland 
Barthes and Georges Didi-Huberman. Wheatley offers a thorough evaluation of Cavell’s canonical 
place in the history of Film Studies, and in doing so charts the tortuous trajectory of how Film 
Studies in turn has critically understood and misunderstood his work. Fortified by the idea that 
film is central to all of Cavell’s thought, Wheatley takes a chronological approach, with each 
chapter charting the evolution of main Cavellian concepts/principles (the promise of ordinary 
language philosophy; problems of everyday scepticism and acknowledgement; the 
reconceptualisation of moral perfectionism) by delving into works in which they receive their 
fullest consideration. The ultimate aim is to reveal the full depth behind Cavell’s longstanding 
claim that, rather than treating film as an immutable object, his work is an “accounting for his own 
experience of movies”, which in turn requires “taking responsibility for his responses” (14). 
 
Cavell’s thought has long been notoriously, even self-admittedly (see The World Viewed 
162) difficult to fully comprehend, which makes this a much-needed and welcome compendium, 
especially for students and scholars not versed in the traditions of what Wheatley calls his 
“problematic relationship to a dominant philosophical divide” (19). Cavell’s analytic background 
often clashes with his more continental concerns and writing style, resulting in a hybrid which 
some read as “excessive” and “self-indulgent” (13). All this to say Cavell remains “a somewhat 
divisive, elusive figure for Film Studies” (21). This divisiveness is reflected in an uncritical yet 
enduring alignment of his thought with, on one hand, a lineage of so-called “realists” stemming 
from André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer, and on the other, with Gilles Deleuze as part of Film 
Studies’ philosophical turn. While the former is attributed to the canonisation of “three short and 
largely unrepresentative chapters” in the standard anthology Film Theory and Criticism (23), it is 
more difficult to pinpoint what brings Cavell and Deleuze together beyond their shared vision of 
“cinema split in two” between a classical and modernist impulse just after World War Two (83). 
Wheatley seems to agree, and therefore avoids exploring connections between Cavell’s ideas on 
cinematic modernism and Deleuze’s time image.  
 
Neither a proponent of realism nor some merely esoteric philosopher, Wheatley’s claim is 




a favourable comparison of Christian Metz’s ideas on the metaphysical barrier between spectator 
and screen to Cavell’s notion that this relationship should be understood “not in terms of realism 
but in terms of reality and our connection to it” (70). Thus Chapter Three is dedicated to explicating 
what is “perhaps the key claim” of Cavell’s cinematic ontology in The World Viewed (70), namely 
that classical cinema’s traditions automatically satisfy our natural wish to overcome the confines 
of subjectivity. The world of classical cinema, with its seemingly natural forms and characters, is 
presented to us as if by magic—that is, without us having to impose our will for it to appear as this 
world. Cavell’s great insight is that this is also a reinscription of the modern subject’s everyday 
sceptical position, in that the world presented seemingly in its fullness is nonetheless impenetrable 
in its absence. Hence Cavell’s interest in classical cinema as a “moving image of skepticism” (87). 
Countering the automata of classicism is modernism, which for Cavell appears when traditions no 
longer automatically satisfy, resulting in a “loss of conviction in film’s capacity to carry the 
world’s presence” (88). This loss of our “natural relation” to cinema reveals a second, more 
palpable scepticism, in which the modernist auteur offers their own subjectivity in order “to tell, 
rather than to show” a cinematic world (88).  
 
Wheatley explains how the onset of cinematic modernism overlaps Cavell’s sense of loss 
about his own “natural relation” with cinema, and in turn how this loss directly informs his ideas 
on cinematic ontology in The World Viewed. Thus her incisive explications of Cavell-as-spectator 
lead her to logically posit that “there is no ontology of film that does not involve a film-viewer” 
(71). However, discussing Cavell primarily as a “theorist of spectatorship” minimises the essential 
fact that he is always the one viewing. His initial encounters with cinema are the ground from 
which theoretical extrapolations spring. Perhaps what is missing in Wheatley’s discussion is an 
exploration of Cavell’s relationship to phenomenology, an avenue of inquiry suggested by Dudley 
Andrew (182−83). Cavell’s philosophy relies upon an attentiveness toward and an accounting for 
his immediate viewing experiences. This is similar to the task Maurice Merleau-Ponty sets out for 
phenomenology, which aims at “re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and 
endowing that contact with a philosophical status” (vii). Furthermore, Wheatley points out that 
“one of the important discoveries of The World Viewed” is its emphasis on the manifold ways 
“film allows us to look ‘as if anew’ at what is onscreen” (100). This seems almost a direct reference 
to Edmund Husserl’s method of phenomenological epochē, the ultimate aim of which is to unmask 
sedimented ideas by attempting to become what he calls a “disinterested spectator” of the world 
(157; 239). The notion that cinema itself might perform an epochē of the world, similar to what 
Cavell terms as the world “screened”, needs further exploration.  
 
Since Cavell’s work is predicated on his personal cinematic encounters, any critical 
assessment must eventually circle the focus back on the man himself. From the outset, Wheatley 
recognises that Cavell writes from a place of white, male, Ivy League privilege (16), and justifiably 
spends a great deal of time on Cavell’s initial failures to address the blind spots of gender, race 
and, to a lesser extent, sexuality, for which critics have taken him to task. Wheatley is balanced in 
her assessments, treating these criticisms with the seriousness they deserve while placing them in 
the context of Cavell’s ultimate aims. They begin with Pursuits of Happiness, the primary subject 
of Chapter Four, in which Cavell attempts to understand how overcoming scepticism feeds the 
myth and logic of the Classical Hollywood remarriage comedy. Wheatley outlines contentions 
from critics Kathrina Glitre and Catherine Constable that the book is “underpinned by a level of 




premised on the man’s education of the woman” (128). This leads to the claim that Cavell often 
misreads who exactly is educating whom in these films, evidenced by a summary of persuasive 
arguments against Cavell’s reading of The Awful Truth (Leo McCarey, 1937) (128−29). Wheatley 
attempts to temper these criticisms by explicating the links between the remarriage comedy and 
Cavell’s rather complex reading of the myth of the Fall (130−31).  
 
Wheatley also considers the forceful criticisms of Contesting Tears, the focus of Chapter 
Five, in which Cavell turns to the Hollywood melodrama of the unknown woman. Interestingly, 
as Wheatley points out, “every feature that made up the foundational myth of remarriage comedy 
finds its opposite in the melodramas” (147). Even so, Cavell still tends toward gender blindness. 
Tania Modleski, for example, “chides Cavell for his appropriation of female suffering” (176) in 
the name of abstract theoretical constructs of the feminine. Wheatley outlines the primary debate, 
which revolves around Cavell’s challenge to the standard reading by Linda Williams and others 
that Stella Dallas (King Vidor, 1937) devalues its titular character as both mother and woman due 
to her inability to understand the rules of conventional society. Cavell contends that there is no 
misunderstanding, and that Stella in fact “abdicates her role of mother on purpose” (164). 
Wheatley agrees, asking: “Is it so difficult, after all, to imagine that a woman might actually want 
to be something other than a mother?” (165). 
 
More difficult to assess is Cavell’s reading of Fred Astaire’s well-known “shoeshine” 
number in The Band Wagon (Vincente Minnelli, 1953). Cavell claims it is “a dance of praise”, 
insisting it involves “acknowledgment of the genius of black dancing […] an acknowledgement 
of debt, a recognition that another’s dancing has been appropriated” (230). Wheatley grants a large 
amount of space to critical analyses from Robert Gooding-Williams and others, who instead claim 
the scene problematically mirrors this appropriation from a position of 1950s Hollywood white 
privilege and dominance. Wheatley concludes that “Cavell’s praise of Astaire’s praise may well 
be misplaced” (234).  
 
Wheatley makes explicit that the criticisms above point to the possibility that Cavell is 
“failing, in his own way, to acknowledge the existence of others” (159). This is a serious charge, 
since, as explicated in Chapter Four, acknowledgement is a key component in Cavell’s response 
to scepticism. For Cavell, scepticism cannot be overcome via certainty; to be absolutely certain 
about another’s pain (to use Cavell’s example from both “Knowing and Acknowledging” and The 
Claim of Reason) is an impossible task. Perceiving another’s pain demands acknowledging and 
responding to it in some way, not proof about its veracity. Thus, with these criticisms “ringing in 
his ears” (159), Cavell is eventually moved to acknowledge them in his own work. For example, 
Wheatley reveals how he incorporates the criticisms of Modleski and others in the final version of 
Contesting Tears, and later, in “The Incessance and the Absence of the Political”, how he admits 
having ignored African-American philosophical thought in response to specific criticisms 
surrounding his work on The Band Wagon. Thus Wheatley reads Cavell as taking his own ideas to 
heart by acknowledging others and acting accordingly, and posits that this action leads to moral 
self-reflection: “It is as a result of the conversations […] that he enters into with Modleski, 
Williams and others, that Cavell comes to turn back to himself, to consider the place of his own 
voice in these conversations, and to ‘begin to write autobiographically’” (177−78). This renewed 




between epistemology and ethics” and thus “marks a turn away from scepticism as Cavell’s first 
concern and towards the explicit moral philosophy that will shape Cavell’s work to come” (139). 
 
Cavell’s turn toward moral philosophy is built upon a reconceptualisation of philosophical 
perfectionism, an idea which receives its fullest articulation in “The Good of Film” and 
subsequently shapes the essays in Cities of Words, the primary focus of Chapter Six. Inspired by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s ideas on self-reliance, Cavellian moral perfection describes “the 
unattained yet attainable self”, in which “every attained state is effectively perfect just as it is–and 
yet it could still be more perfect” (184). On the surface, perfectionism could be misconstrued as a 
call to “self-improvement”, complete with all the culturally determined self-help connotations this 
implies. Although Wheatley uses this slightly misleading term, she clarifies that, for Cavell, this 
is a “debasement” of perfectionism (207). Instead, Cavellian perfectionism depends upon 
conceptualising “a split in the human self, seeing human nature as divided or double” (186), and 
thus involves the rather Kierkegaardian everyday choice of self. Guiding this choice of self is 
acknowledgement of an exemplar who inspires what Cavell calls “moral reasoning”: dialogue 
aimed at making oneself intelligible to others as well as to oneself. Wheatley recasts Cavell’s work 
on comedy and melodrama in this perfectionist light, recalling how exemplary dialogue manifests 
in particularly gendered ways for the comedies, whereas in the melodramas it becomes instead a 
monologue in which a long-suffering woman “must simply reach inside herself in order to find an 
exemplar” (196). Notably, even after claiming Cavell’s dialogue with critics leads to his own 
perfectionism, Wheatley finds little evidence of it in most of the essays in Cities of Words, wryly 
commenting that “in perfectionism, as in the overcoming of scepticism, the ‘creation of women’ 
remains the ‘business of men’” (196). The one exception, perhaps not surprisingly, is Cavell’s 
essay on Conte d’hiver (Eric Rohmer, 1992), a rare departure from his usual focus on Classical 
Hollywood genre. Wheatley appropriately offers a lengthy, nuanced analysis of Cavell’s response 
to its lead character’s journey toward her perfectionist moment. 
 
Importantly, Wheatley notes that the films Cavell cares about “do not just show us 
transformation, but they bring about transformation, in the spectator” (209). For Cavell, film can 
be an exemplar for our own lives, since it has the potential to reveal that “every decision we 
make—however big or small—is in a sense a moral decision” (191). This is Cavell’s sense of the 
“good” of film. However, it must be remembered that this “good” is not an objective description, 
in the sense of “a good film”. It seems more precise, following Cavell himself, to suggest the good 
of film depends on a “good encounter” (Pursuits of Happiness 13), since encountering the same 
film twice does not necessarily mean one will have the same experience each time. There is always 
the danger that one might miss or even dismiss what makes any cinematic encounter “good”. This 
justifies Wheatley’s insistence on concluding her book with evaluations of various paradigms 
under which Cavell’s criticism can ultimately be read as an act of love, a “passionate utterance” 
aimed at clarifying his good encounters with film for himself by making them understood to others 
(236). Wheatley emphasises that this love runs the risk, not of rebuke, but of dismissal: “To rebuke 
someone is to enter or to acknowledge already being entered into a community, a culture […] to 
dismiss someone is to plunge into scepticism” (242). At bottom, then, Wheatley’s book can be 
understood as its own Cavellian act of love. She seeks to acknowledge, often via critical rebuke 
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Glen W. Norton teaches in the Department of English and Film Studies at Wilfrid Laurier 
University. His research embraces phenomenological approaches toward the study of cinema, with 
focus on the ties between the expression of lived temporality and existential ethics. He is the digital 
curator of Cinema=Godard=Cinema, an online, open-access website dedicated to scholarly 
study of the work of Jean-Luc Godard. He is currently completing Lived Moments: 
Phenomenology, Neorealism, and the New Wave, which charts an evolving modernist attitude 
toward the intertwining of cinema and lived experience. 
